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Abstract
Adversarial examples are a pervasive phenomenon of machine learning models where seemingly imper-
ceptible perturbations to the input lead to misclassifications for otherwise statistically accurate models. We
propose a geometric framework, drawing on tools from the manifold reconstruction literature, to analyze the
high-dimensional geometry of adversarial examples. In particular, we highlight the importance of codimen-
sion: for low-dimensional data manifolds embedded in high-dimensional space there are many directions off the
manifold in which an adversary could construct adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are a natural con-
sequence of learning a decision boundary that classifies the low-dimensional data manifold well, but classifies
points near the manifold incorrectly. Using our geometric framework we prove that adversarial training is sample
inefficient, and show sufficient sampling conditions under which nearest neighbor classifiers and ball-based ad-
versarial training are robust. Finally we introduce adversarial training with Voronoi constraints, which replaces
the norm ball constraint with the Voronoi cell for each point in the training set. We show that adversarial training
with Voronoi constraints produces robust models which significantly improve over the state-of-the-art on MNIST
and are competitive on CIFAR-10.
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1 Introduction
Deep learning at scale has led to breakthroughs on important problems in computer vision (Krizhevsky et al.
(2012)), natural language processing (Wu et al. (2016)), and robotics (Levine et al. (2015)). Shortly thereafter,
the interesting phenomena of adversarial examples was observed. A seemingly ubiquitous property of machine
learning models where perturbations of the input that are imperceptible to humans reliably lead to confident
incorrect classifications (Szegedy et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2014)). What has ensued is a standard story
from the security literature: a game of cat and mouse where defenses are proposed only to be quickly defeated by
stronger attacks (Athalye et al. (2018)). This has led researchers to develop methods which are provably robust
under specific attack models (Wong and Kolter (2018); Sinha et al. (2018); Raghunathan et al. (2018); Mirman
et al. (2018)) as well as emperically strong heuristics (Madry et al. (2018)). As machine learning proliferates into
society, including security-critical settings like health care (Esteva et al. (2017)) or autonomous vehicles (Codevilla
et al. (2018)), it is crucial to develop methods that allow us to understand the vulnerability of our models and design
appropriate counter-measures.
In this paper, we propose a geometric framework for analyzing the phenomenon of adversarial examples.
We leverage the observation that datasets encountered in practice exhibit low-dimensional structure despite being
embedded in very high-dimensional input spaces. This property is colloquially referred to as the “Manifold
Hypothesis”: the idea that low-dimensional structure of ‘real’ data leads to tractable learning. We model data
as being sampled from class-specific low-dimensional manifolds embedded in a high-dimensional space. We
consider a threat model where an adversary may choose any point on the data manifold to perturb by  in order
to fool a classifier. In order to be robust to such an adversary, a classifier must be correct everywhere in an -tube
around the data manifold. Observe that, even though the data manifold is a low-dimensional object, this tube
has the same dimension as the entire space the manifold is embedded in. Our analysis argues that adversarial
examples are a natural consequence of learning a decision boundary that classifies all points on a low-dimensional
data manifold correctly, but classifies many points near the manifold incorrectly. The high codimension, the
difference between the dimension of the data manifold and the dimension of the embedding space, is a key source
of the pervasiveness of adversarial examples.
Our paper makes the following contributions. First, we develop a geometric framework, inspired by the
manifold reconstruction literature, that formalizes the manifold hypothesis described above and our attack model.
Second, we highlight the role codimension plays in vulnerability to adversarial examples. As the codimension
increases, there are an increasing number of directions off the data manifold in which to construct adversarial
perturbations. Prior work has attributed vulnerability to adversarial examples to input dimension (Gilmer et al.
(2018); Shafahi et al. (2019)). Third, we apply this framework to analyze the standard approach to adversarial
training. We define a theoretical model L of adversarial training (see Definition 1), which guarantees correctness
in the ‖·‖p-balls centered on training data, and prove that L is insufficient to learn robust decision boundaries with
realistic amounts of data. We show that nearest neighbor classifiers do not suffer from this insufficiency, due to
geometric properties of their decision boundary away from data. Fourth we propose a modification to the standard
paradigm of adversarial training. We replace the ‖ · ‖p-ball constraint with the Voronoi cells of the training data,
which have several advantages detailed in Section 5. In particular, we need not set the maximum perturbation size
 as part of the training procedure. In Section 6 we show that adversarial training with Voronoi constraints gives
state-of-the-art robustness results on MNIST and competitive results on CIFAR-10.
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Examples
Some previous work has considered the relationships between adversarial examples and high dimensional geom-
etry. Franceschi et al. (2018) explore the robustness of classifiers to random noise in terms of distance to the
decision boundary, under the assumption that the decision boundary is locally flat. The work of Gilmer et al.
(2018) experimentally evaluated the setting of two concentric under-sampled 499-spheres embedded in R500, and
concluded that adversarial examples occur on the data manifold. In contrast, we present a geometric framework
for proving robustness guarantees for learning algorithms, that makes no assumptions on the decision boundary.
We carefully sample the data manifold in order to highlight the importance of codimension; adversarial examples
exist even when the manifold is perfectly classified. Additionally we explore the importance of the spacing be-
tween the constituent data manifolds, sampling requirements for learning algorithms, and the relationship between
model complexity and robustness.
Wang et al. (2018) explore the robustness of k-nearest neighbor classifiers to adversarial examples. In the
setting where the Bayes optimal classifier is uncertain about the true label of each point, they show that k-nearest
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neighbors is not robust if k is a small constant. They also show that if k ∈ Ω(√dn log n), then k-nearest neighbors
is robust. Using our geometric framework we show a complementary result: in the setting where each point is
certain of its label, 1-nearest neighbors is robust to adversarial examples.
The decision and medial axes defined in Section 3 are maximum margin decision boundaries. Hard margin
SVMs define define a linear separator with maximum margin, maximum distance from the training data (Cortes
and Vapnik (1995)). Kernel methods allow for maximum margin decision boundaries that are non-linear by
using additional features to project the data into a higher-dimensional feature space (Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini
(2004)). The decision and medial axes generalize the notion of maximum margin to account for the arbitrary
curvature of the data manifolds. There have been attempts to incorporate maximum margins into deep learning
(Sun et al. (2016); Liu et al. (2016); Liang et al. (2017); Elsayed et al. (2018)), often by designing loss functions
that encourage large margins at either the output (Sun et al. (2016)) or at any layer (Elsayed et al. (2018)). In
contrast, the decision axis is defined on the input space and we use it as an analysis tool for proving guarantees.
2.2 Manifold Reconstruction
Manifold reconstruction is the problem of discovering the structure of a k-dimensional manifold embedded in Rd,
given only a set of points sampled from the manifold. A large vein of research in manifold reconstruction develops
algorithms that are provably good: if the points sampled from the underlying manifold are sufficiently dense,
these algorithms are guaranteed to produce a geometrically accurate representation of the unknown manifold
with the correct topology. The output of these algorithms is often a simplicial complex, a set of simplices such
as triangles, tetrahedra, and higher-dimensional variants, that approximate the unknown manifold. In particular
these algorithms output subsets of the Delaunay triangulation, which along with their geometric dual the Voronoi
diagram, have properties that aid in proving geometric and topological guarantees (Edelsbrunner and Shah (1997)).
The field first focused on curve reconstruction in R2 (Amenta et al. (1998)) and subsequently in R3 (Dey and
Kumar (1999)). Soon after algorithms were developed for surface reconstruction in R3, both in the noise-free
setting (Amenta and Bern (1999); Amenta et al. (2002)) and in the presence of noise (Dey and Goswami (2004)).
We borrow heavily from the analysis tools of these early works, including the medial axis and the reach. However
we emphasize that we have adapted these tools to the learning setting. To the best of our knowledge, our work is
the first to consider the medial axis under different norms.
In higher-dimensional embedding spaces (large d), manifold reconstruction algorithms face the curse of di-
mensionality. In particular, the Delaunay triangulation, which forms the bedrock of algorithms in low-dimensions,
of n vertices in Rd can have up to Θ(ndd/2e) simplices. To circumvent the curse of dimensionality, algorithms
were proposed that compute subsets of the Delaunay triangulation restricted to the k-dimensional tangent spaces of
the manifold at each sample point (Boissonnat and Ghosh (2014)). Unfortunately, progress on higher-dimensional
manifolds has been limited due to the presence of so-called “sliver” simplices, poorly shaped simplices that cause
in-consistences between the local triangulations constructed in each tangent space (Cheng et al. (2005); Boisson-
nat and Ghosh (2014)). Techniques that provably remove sliver simplices have prohibitive sampling requirements
(Cheng et al. (2000); Boissonnat and Ghosh (2014)). Even in the special case of surfaces (k = 2) embedded
in high dimensions (d > 3), algorithms with practical sampling requirements have only recently been proposed
(Khoury and Shewchuk (2016)). Our use of tubular neighborhoods as a tool for analysis is borrowed from Dey
et al. (2005) and Khoury and Shewchuk (2016).
In this paper we are interested in learning robust decision boundaries, not reconstructing the underlying data
manifolds, and so we avoid the use of Delaunay triangulations and their difficulties entirely. In Section 4 we
present robustness guarantees for two learning algorithms in terms of a sampling condition on the underlying
manifold. These sampling requirements scale with the dimension of the underlying manifold k, not with the
dimension of the embedding space d.
3 The Geometry of Data
We model data as being sampled from a set of low-dimensional manifolds (with or without boundary) embedded
in a high-dimensional space Rd. We use k to denote the dimension of a manifold M ⊂ Rd. The special case
of a 1-manifold is called a curve, and a 2-manifold is a surface. The codimension ofM is d − k, the difference
between the dimension of the manifold and the dimension of the embedding space. The “Manifold Hypothesis”
is the observation that in practice, data is often sampled from manifolds, usually of high codimension.
In this paper we are primarily interested in the classification problem. Thus we model data as being sampled
from C class manifoldsM1, . . . ,MC , one for each class. When we wish to refer to the entire space from which
a dataset is sampled, we refer to the data manifoldM = ∪1≤j≤CMj . We often work with a finite sample of n
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points, X ⊂ M, and we write X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}. Each sample point Xi has an accompanying class label
yi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C} indicating which manifoldMyi the point Xi is sampled from.
Consider a ‖·‖p-ballB centered at some point c ∈ Rd and imagine growingB by increasing its radius starting
from zero. For nearly all starting points c, the ball B eventually intersects one, and only one, of theMi’s. Thus
the nearest point to c onM, in the norm ‖ · ‖p, lies onMi.
The decision axis Λp of M is the set of points c such that the boundary of B intersects two or more of the
Mi, but the interior of B does not intersect M at all. In other words, the decision axis Λp is the set of points
that have two or more closest points, in the norm ‖ · ‖p, on distinct class manifolds. See Figure 1. The decision
axis is inspired by the medial axis, which was first proposed by Blum (1967) in the context of image analysis
and subsequently modified for the purposes of curve and surface reconstruction by Amenta et al. (1998; 2002).
We have modified the definition to account for multiple class manifolds and have renamed our variant in order to
avoid confusion in the future.
M1
M1
M1
M2
M2
M2
⇤2
⇤2
⇤2
rch2 ⇤2
rch2 ⇤2
rch2 ⇤2
Figure 1: Examples of the decision axis Λ2, shown here in green, for different data manifolds. Intuitively, the
decision axis captures an optimal decision boundary between the data manifolds. It’s optimal in the sense that
each point on the decision axis is as far away from each data manifold as possible. Notice that in the first example,
the decision axis coincides with the maximum margin line.
The decision axis Λp can intuitively be thought of as a decision boundary that is optimal in the following
sense. First, Λp separates the class manifolds when they do not intersect. Second, each point of Λp is as far away
from the class manifolds as possible in the norm ‖ · ‖p. As shown in the leftmost example in Figure 1, in the case
of two linearly separable circles of equal radius, the decision axis Λ2 is exactly the line that separates the data
with maximum margin. For arbitrary manifolds, Λp generalizes the notion of maximum margin to account for the
curvature of the class manifolds.
Let T ⊂ Rd be any set. The reach rchp (T ;M) of M is defined as infx∈M,y∈T ‖x − y‖p. When M is
compact, the reach is achieved by the point onM that is closest to T under the ‖ · ‖p norm. We will dropM from
the notation when it is understood from context.
Finally, an -tubular neighborhood of M is defined as M,p = {x ∈ Rd : infy∈M ‖x − y‖p ≤ }. That
is,M,p is the set of all points whose distance toM under the metric induced by ‖ · ‖p is less than . Note that
whileM is k-dimensional,M,p is always d-dimensional. Tubular neighborhoods are how we rigorously define
adversarial examples. Consider a classifier f : Rd → [C] forM. An -adversarial example is a point x ∈ M,pi
such that f(x) 6= i. A classifier f is robust to all -adversarial examples when f correctly classifies not onlyM,
but all ofM,p. In this paper we will be primarily concerned with exploring the conditions under which we can
provably learn a decision boundary that correctly classifiesM,p. When  < rchp Λp, the decision axis Λp is one
decision boundary that correctly classifies M,p. Throughout the remainder of the paper we will drop the p in
M,p from the notation, instead writingM; the norm will always be clear from context.
4 Limitations of Adversarial Training
Adversarial training, the process of training on adversarial examples generated in ‖ · ‖p-balls around the training
data, is a very natural approach to constructing robust models (Goodfellow et al. (2014); Madry et al. (2018)). In
our notation this corresponds to training on samples drawn from X for some . Despite its simplicity, adversarial
training has proven to be one of the most successful approaches to training robust deep networks. While natural,
we show that there are simple settings where this approach is much less sample-efficient than other classification
algorithms, if the only guarantee is correctness in X.
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Definition 1 (Adversarial Training). LetX ⊂M be a finite training set. Define an adversarial training algorithm
L as a learning algorithm that, given X , outputs a model fL such that for every x ∈ X with label y, and every
xˆ ∈ B(x, rchp Λp), fL(xˆ) = fL(x) = y. Here B(x, r) denotes the ball centered at x of radius r in the ‖ · ‖p
norm.
L is our theoretical model of the standard approach to adversarial training (Goodfellow et al. (2014); Madry
et al. (2018)). In words, L learns a model that outputs the same label for any ‖ · ‖p-perturbation of x up to rchp Λp
as it outputs for x. We will use L to analyze the limitations of the standard approach to adversarial training; in
particular we will show that L is much less sample efficient at learning a robust decision boundary than other
classification algorithms.
Theorem 1. There exists a classification algorithm A that, for a particular choice ofM, correctly classifiesM
using exponentially fewer samples than are required for L to correctly classifyM.
The reason for the sample inefficiency of L is the use of the ‖ · ‖p-balls centered on the data to propagate
the labels. As we will show below, the union of the balls around the data X covers a vanishingly small fraction
of M in high codimension settings. Thus the adversary is restricted to constructing adversarial examples in a
negligible fraction of the neighborhood around the data manifold. In contrast, other algorithms, such as nearest
neighbor classifiers, propagate labels using different geometric regions, such as the Voronoi cells which we will
define in Section 5. The main takeaway of this paper is that the use of ‖ · ‖p-balls centered on the data leads to
sub-optimal results both in theory and, as we will show in Section 6, in practice.
Theorem 1 follows from Theorems 2 and 3. In Theorems 2 and 3 we will prove that a nearest neighbor classifier
fnn is one such classification algorithm. Nearest neighbor classifiers are naturally robust in high codimensions
because the Voronoi cells of X are elongated in the directions normal toM when X is dense (Dey (2007)).
Before we state Theorem 2 we must introduce a sampling condition onM. A δ-cover of a manifoldM in the
norm ‖·‖p is a finite set of pointsX such that for every x ∈M there existsXi such that ‖x−Xi‖p ≤ δ. Theorem 2
gives a sufficient sampling condition for fL to correctly classifyM for all manifoldsM. Theorem 2 also provides
a sufficient sampling condition for a nearest neighbor classifier fnn to correctly classifyM, which is substantially
less dense than that of fL. Thus different classification algorithms have different sampling requirements in high
codimensions.
Theorem 2. LetM ⊂ Rd be a k-dimensional manifold and let  < rchp Λp for any p > 0. Let fnn be a nearest
neighbor classifier and let fL be the output of a learning algorithm L as described above. Let Xnn, XL ⊂ M
denote the training sets for fnn and L respectively. We have the following sampling guarantees:
1. If Xnn is a δ-cover for δ ≤ 2(rchp Λp − ) then fnn correctly classifiesM.
2. If XL is a δ-cover for δ ≤ rchp Λp −  then fL correctly classifiesM.
The bounds on δ in Theorem 2 are sufficient, but they are not always necessary. There exist manifolds where
the bounds in Theorem 2 are pessimistic, and less dense samples corresponding to larger values of δ would suffice.
Next we will show a setting where bounds on δ similar to those in Theorem 2 are necessary. In this setting,
the difference of a factor of 2 in δ between the sampling requirements of fnn and fL leads to an exponential gap
between the sizes of Xnn and XL necessary to achieve identical robustness.
Define Π1 = {x ∈ Rd : ` ≤ x1, . . . , xk ≤ µ and xk+1 = . . . = xd = 0}; that is Π1 is a subset of the
x1-. . .-xk-plane bounded between the coordinates [`, µ]. Similarly define Π2 = {x ∈ Rd : ` ≤ x1, . . . , xk ≤
µ and xk+1 = . . . = xd−1 = 0 and xd = 2}. Note that Π2 lies in the subspace xd = 2; thus rch2 Λ2 = 1, where
Λ2 is the decision axis of Π = Π1 ∪ Π2. In the ‖ · ‖2 norm we can show that the gap in Theorem 2 is necessary
for Π = Π1 ∪Π2. Furthermore the bounds we derive for δ-covers for Π for both fnn and fL are tight. Combined
with well-known properties of covers, we get that the ratio |XL|/|Xnn| is exponential in k.
Theorem 3. Let Π = Π1 ∪ Π2 as described above. Let Xnn, XL ⊂ Π be minimum training sets necessary to
guarantee that fnn and fL correctly classifyM. Then we have that
|XL|
|Xnn| ∈ Ω
(
2k/2
)
(1)
We have shown that both L and nearest neighbor classifiers learn robust decision boundaries when provided
sufficiently dense samples of M. However there are settings where nearest neighbors is exponentially more
sample-efficient than L in achieving the same amount of robustness.
To shed light on why the ball-based learning algorithmL is so much less sample-efficient than nearest neighbor
classifiers, we show that the volume volX is often a vanishingly small percentage of volM. For our theoretical
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model L this means that a vanishingly small fraction ofM is guaranteed to have the correct label, and in practice
this means that the adversary in adversarial training does not have the freedom to generate adversarial examples
in the entirety ofM. For the remainder of this section we will consider the ‖ · ‖2 norm.
Theorem 4. LetM ⊂ Rd be a k-dimensional manifold embedded in Rd such that volkM < ∞. Let X ⊂ M
be a finite set of points sampled fromM. Suppose that  ≤ rch2 Ξ where Ξ is the medial axis ofM, defined as in
Dey (2007). Then the percentage ofM covered by X is upper bounded by
volX
volM ∈ O
((
2pi
d− k
)k/2
k
volkM|X|
)
. (2)
As the codimension (d− k)→∞, Equation 2 approaches 0, for any fixed |X|.
In high codimension, even moderate under-sampling of M leads to a significant loss of coverage of M
because the volume of the union of balls centered at the samples shrinks faster than the volume ofM. Theorem 4
states that in high codimensions the fraction ofM covered byX goes to 0. Almost nothing is covered byX for
training set sizes that are realistic in practice. Thus X is a poor model ofM, and high classification accuracy
on X does not imply high accuracy inM.
Approaches that produce robust classifiers by generating adversarial examples in the -balls centered on the
training set do not accurately model M, and it will take many more samples to do so. If the method behaves
arbitrarily outside of the -balls that define X, adversarial examples will still exist and it will likely be easy to
find them. The reason deep learning has performed so well on a variety of tasks, in spite of the brittleness made
apparent by adversarial examples, is because it is much easier to perform well onM than it is to perform well on
M.
5 Adversarial Training with Voronoi Constraints
Madry et al. (2018) formalize adversarial training by introducing the robust objective
min
θ
E(x,y)∈D
[
max
xˆ∈B(x,)
L(xˆ, y; θ)
]
(3)
where D is the data distribution and B is a ‖ · ‖p-ball centered at x with radius . Their main contribution was the
use of a strong adversary which used projected gradient descent to solve the inner optimization problem.
In Sections 4, we showed that adversarial training formalized using the geometric constraint B is sample
inefficient, because the adversary is restricted to a negligible fraction of the -tubular neighborhood around the
data distribution. To remedy this we replace the ‖ · ‖p-ball constraint with a different geometric constraint, namely
the Voronoi cell at x. That is, we formalize the adversarial training objective as
min
θ
E(x,y)∈D
[
max
xˆ∈Vorp x
L(xˆ, y; θ)
]
(4)
where
Vorp x = {x′ ∈ Rd : ‖x− x′‖p ≤ ‖z − x′‖p ∀z ∈ X\{x}}. (5)
In words, the Voronoi cell Vorp x of x is the set of all points in Rd that are closer to x than to any other sample in
X .
The Voronoi cell constraint has many advantages over the ‖·‖p-ball constraint. First the Voronoi cells partition
the entirety ofRd and so the interiors of Voronoi cells generated by samples from different classes do not intersect.
This is in contrast to ‖ · ‖p-balls which may intersect for sufficiently large  and cause problems for optimization.
In particular the Voronoi cells partition M and, for dense samples, are elongated in the directions normal to
the data manifold. Thus the Voronoi cells are well suited for high codimension settings. Second, the size of the
Voronoi cells adapts to the data distribution. A Voronoi cell generated by a sample which is close to samples from
a different class manifold is smaller, while those further away are larger. Thus we do not need to set a value for
 in the optimization procedure. The constraint naturally adapts to the largest value of  possible locally on the
data manifold. Third, the Voronoi cells enjoy the sample efficiency of fnn in Theorem 2, because the Voronoi
cells define the nearest neighbor decision boundary. In summary, the Voronoi constraint gives the adversary the
freedom to explore the entirety of the tubular neighborhood aroundM.
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At each iteration we must solve the inner optimization problem
maximize
xˆ
L(xˆ, y; θ)
subject to ‖x− xˆ‖p − ‖z − xˆ‖p ≤ 0 ∀z ∈ X − {x}.
(6)
When p = 2 the Voronoi cells are convex and so we can project a point onto a Voronoi cell by solving a
quadratic program. Thus we can solve Problem 6 using projected gradient descent, as in Madry et al. (2018).
When p 6= 2 the Voronoi cells are not necessarily convex. In this setting there are many approaches, such
as barrier and penalty methods, one might employ to approximately solve Problem 6 (Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004)). However we found that the following heuristic is both fast and works well in practice. At each iteration of
the outer training loop, for each training sample x in a batch, we generate adversarial examples by taking iterative
steps in the direction of the gradient starting from x. However instead of projecting onto a constraint after each
iterative step, we instead check if any of the Voronoi constraints of x shown in Equation 5 are violated. If no
constraint is violated we perform the iterative update, otherwise we simply stop performing updates for x.
Problem 6 has n − 1 constraints, one for each sample in X\{x}. In practice however very few samples
contribute to the Voronoi cell of x. At each iteration, we perform a nearest neighbor search query to find the m
nearest samples to x in each other class. That is we search for m(C − 1) samples where C is the number of
classes. We do not impose constraints from samples in the same class as x; there is no benefit to restricting the
adversary’s movement with the tubular neighborhood around the class manifold of x. In our experiments we set
m = 10.
6 Experiments
Datasets. To investigate how the codimension of a dataset influences robustness we introduce two synthetic
datasets, CIRCLES and PLANES, which allow us to carefully vary the codimension while maintaining dense sam-
ples. The CIRCLES dataset consists of two concentric circles in the x1-x2-plane, the first with radius r1 = 1 and
the second with radius r2 = 3, so that rch2 Λ2 = 1. We densely sample 1000 random points on each circle for both
the training and the test sets. The PLANES dataset consists of two 2-dimensional planes, the first in the xd = 0 and
the second in xd = 2, so that rch2 Λ2 = 1. The first two axis of both planes are bounded as −10 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 10,
while x3 = . . . = xd−1 = 0. We sample the training set at the vertices of a regular grid with side length
√
2, and
the test set at the centers of the grid cubes. We also evaluate on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Models. Our controlled experiments on synthetic data consider a fully connected network with 1 hidden layer,
100 hidden units, and ReLU activations. We set the learning rate for Adam (Kingma and Ba (2015)) as α = 0.1.
Our experimental results are averaged over 20 retrainings. For a fair comparison, our experiments on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 use the same model architectures as in Madry et al. (2018). We train the MNIST model using Adam
for 100 epochs and the CIFAR-10 model using SGD for 250 epochs.
Attacks. We consider two attacks, the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al. (2014)) and the
basic iterative method (BIM) (Kurakin et al. (2016)). We use the implementations provided in the cleverhans
library Papernot et al. (2018)
Accuracy measures. We plot the minimum classification accuracy across our suite of attacks as a function of
, for each of our datasets. Additionally we report the normalized area under the curve (NAUC) defined as
NAUC(acc) =
1
max
∫ max
0
acc() d, (7)
where acc : [0, max]→ [0, 1] measures the classification accuracy and max is the largest perturbation considered.
Note that NAUC ∈ [0, 1] with higher values corresponding to more robust models.
6.1 High Codimension Reduces Robustness
Section 4 suggests that as the codimension increases it should become easier to find adversarial examples, which
Figure 2 (Top Left) shows on the CIRCLES dataset. We see a steady decrease in robustness as we increase the
codimension.
6.2 Adversarial Training in High Codimensions
Figure 2 (Top Right, Bottom Left, Bottom Right) explores the use of adversarial training to improve robustness in
high codimension settings for the PLANES dataset. As shown in Figure 2 (Top Right), as the codimension increases
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the adversarial training approach of Madry et al. (2018) becomes less robust. This is because the ‖·‖2 balls around
Π cover a smaller fraction of the tubular neighborhood around Π, as predicted by Theorem 4. In Appendix B.1
we show that even significantly increasing the sampling density does not notably improve robustness in high
codimensions.
Replacing the ‖ · ‖2 ball constraint with the Voronoi cells improves robustness in high codimension settings,
on average. In codimension 10 (Figure 2 (Bottom Left)), our approach achieves NAUC of 0.99, while Madry’s
approach achieves NAUC of 0.94. In codimension 500 (Figure 2 (Bottom Right)), our approach achieves NAUC
of 0.92, while Madry’s approach achieves NAUC of 0.87.
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Figure 2: Top Right: As the codimension increases the robustness of decision boundaries learned by Adam on
naturally trained networks for CIRCLES decreases steadily. Top Left: Training using the adversarial training
procedure of Madry et al. (2018) is no guarantee of robustness; as the codimension increases it becomes easier
to find adversarial examples for PLANES. Bottom: Training using adversarial training with Voronoi constraints
offers improved robustness in high codimension settings, on average.
6.3 MNIST and CIFAR-10
To explore the performances of adversarial training with Voronoi constraints on more realistic datasets, we evaluate
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 and compare against the robust pretrained models of Madry et al. (2018).
Figure 3 (Left) shows that our model maintains near identical robustness to the Madry model on MNIST up
to  = 0.3, after which our model significantly outperforms the Madry model. The Madry model was explicitly
trained for  = 0.3 perturbations. We emphasize that one advantage of our approach is that we did not need to
set a value for the maximum perturbation size . The Voronoi cells adapt to the maximum size allowable locally
on the data distribution. Our model maintains 76.3% accuracy at  = 0.4 compared to 2.6% accuracy for the
Madry model. Furthermore our model achieves NAUC of 0.81, while the Madry model achieves NAUC of 0.67,
an improvement of 20.8% over the baseline. To our knowledge, this is the most robust MNIST model to ‖ · ‖∞
attacks.
Figure 3 (Right) shows the results of our approach on CIFAR-10. Both our model and the Madry model
achieve NAUC of 0.29. However our approach trades natural accuracy for increased robustness against larger
perturbations. This tradeoff is well-known and explored in Tsipras et al. (2019).
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Figure 3: Left: Adversarial training with Voronoi constraints on MNIST. Our model has NAUC 0.81 and high
classification accuracy after  = 0.3. In particular, our model maintains 76.3% accuracy at  = 0.4, compared to
2.6% accuracy for the Madry model. Right: On CIFAR-10, both models achieve NAUC of 0.29, but our model
trades natural accuracy for robustness to larger perturbations.
A natural approach to improving the robustness of models produced by the adversarial training paradigm of
Madry et al. (2018) is to simply increase the maximum allowable perturbation size  of the norm ball constraint.
As shown in Figure 4, increasing the size of  to 0.4, from the 0.3 with which Madry et al. (2018) originally
trained, and training for only 100 epochs produces a model which exhibits significantly worse robustness in the
range [0, 0.3] than the pretrained model. If we increase the number of training epochs to 150, the approach of
Madry et al. (2018) with  = 0.4 produces a model with improved robustness in the range [0.3, 0.4], but that
still exhibits the sharp drop in accuracy after 0.4. Additionally the model trained with  = 0.4 for 150 epochs
performs worse than both the pretrained model and our model in the range [0, 0.3]. Our model achieves NAUC
0.81, while the model trained with  = 0.4 for 150 epochs achieves NAUC 0.76. We emphasize that our approach
does not require us to set , which is particularly important in practice where the maximum amount of robustness
achievable may not be known a-priori.
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Figure 4: The adversarial training of Madry et al. (2018) with  = 0.4 (shown in green) produces a model with
significantly reduced robustness in the range [0, 0.3]. Increasing the number of epochs to 150, the resulting model
(shown in purple) does exhibit improved robustness in the range [0.3, 0.4], at the expense of some robustness in
the range [0, 0.3] and still exhibits a sharp drop in accuracy after 0.4. The purple model achieves NAUC of 0.76,
while our model achieves NAUC 0.81.
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7 Conclusions
The ‖·‖p-ball constraint for describing adversarial perturbations has been a productive formalization for designing
robust deep networks. However, the use of ‖ · ‖p-balls has significant drawbacks in high-codimension settings and
leads to sub-optimal results in practice. Adversarial training with Voronoi constraints improves robustness by
giving the adversary the freedom to exploreM and generate adversarial examples close to Λp.
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Figure 5: Proof of Theorem 2. The distance from a query point q toM2, and thus the closest incorrectly labeled
sample, is lower bounded by the distance necessary to reach the medial axis Λp plus the distance from Λp toM2.
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Here we use d(·, ·) to denote the metric induced by the ‖ · ‖p norm. We begin by proving (1). Let q ∈M
be any point inM. Suppose without loss of generality that q ∈Mi for some class i. The distance d(q,Mj) from
q to any other data manifoldMj , and thus any sample onMj , is lower bounded by d(q,Mj) ≥ 2 rchp Λp − .
See Figure 5. It is then both necessary and sufficient that there exists a x ∈Mi such that d(q, x) < 2 rchp Λp − 
for fnn(q) = i. (Necessary since a properly placed sample onMj can achieve the lower bound on d(q,Mj).)
The distance from q to the nearest sample x onMi is d(q, x) ≤ + δ for some δ > 0. The question is how large
can we allow δ to be and still guarantee that fnn correctly classifiesM? We need
d(q, x) ≤ + δ ≤ 2 rchp Λp −  ≤ d(q,Mj)
which implies that δ ≤ 2(rchp Λp− ). It follows that a δ-cover with δ = 2(rchp Λp− ) is sufficient, and in some
cases necessary, to guarantee that fnn correctly classifiesM.
Next we prove (2). As before let q ∈ Mi . It is both necessary and sufficient for q ∈ B(x, rchp Λp) for some
sample x ∈ Mi to guarantee that fL(q) = i, by definition of L. The distance to the nearest sample x onMi is
d(q, x) ≤ + δ for some δ > 0. Thus it suffices that δ ≤ rchp Λp − .
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let q ∈ Π1. Since Π1 is flat, the distance from q to the nearest sample x ∈ Π1 is bounded as ‖q − x‖2 ≤√
2 + δ2. For fnn(q) = 1 we need that ‖q− x‖2 ≤ 2− , and so it suffices that δ ≤ 2
√
1− . In this setting, this
is also necessary; should δ be any larger a property placed sample on Π2 can claim q in its Voronoi cell.
Similarly for fL(q) = 1 we need that ‖q − x‖2 ≤ 1, and so it suffices that δ ≤
√
1− 2. In this setting, this is
also necessary; should δ be any larger, q lies outside of every ‖ ·‖2-ball B(x, 1) and so L is free to learn a decision
boundary that misclassifies q.
Let N (δ,M) denote the size of the minimum δ-cover ofM. Since Π is flat (has no curvature) and since the
intersection of Π with a d-ball centered at a point on Π is a k-ball, a standard volume argument can be applied in
the affine subspace aff Π to conclude that N (δ,Π) ∈ Θ (volk Π/δk). So we have
N (√1− 2,Π)
N (2√1− ,Π) ∈ Ω
(
2k
(
1
1 + 
)k/2)
∈ Ω
(
2k/2
)
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Assuming the balls centered on the samples in X are disjoint we get the upper bound
volX ≤ volB|X| = pi
d/2
Γ(d2 + 1)
d|X|. (8)
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The medial axis Ξ ofM is defined as the closure of the set of all points in Rd that have two or more closest
points onM in the norm ‖ · ‖2. The medial axis Ξ is similar to the decision axis Λ2, except that the nearest points
do not need to be on distinct class manifolds. For  ≤ rch2 Ξ, we have the lower bound
volM ≥ vold−k Bd−k volkM =
pi(d−k)/2
Γ
(
d−k
2 + 1
)d−k volkM. (9)
Combining Equations 8 and 9 gives the result. To get the asymptotic result we apply Stirling’s approximation
to get
Γ(d−k2 + 1)
Γ(d2 + 1)
≈ (2e)k/2 (d− k)
(d−k+1)/2
d(d+1)/2
= (2e)k/2
(
d−k
d
)(d+1)/2
(d− k)k/2
= (2e)k/2
(
1− kd
)(d+1)/2
(d− k)k/2
≈
(
2
d− k
)k/2
.
The last step follows from the fact that limd→∞(1 − k/d)(d+1)/2 = e−k/2, where e is the base of the natural
logarithm.
B Additional Experiments
B.1 Increasing Sampling Density
The PLANES dataset is sampled so that the trianing set is a 1-cover of the underlying planes, which requires 450
sample points. Figure 6 shows the results of increasing the sampling density to a 0.5-cover (1682 samples) and
a 0.25-cover (6498 samples). In low-codimension, increasing the sampling density improves the robustness of
adversarial training. However, in high-codimension, even a substantial increase in the number of samples gives a
only a small improvement in robustness.
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Figure 6: Adversarial training of Madry et al. (2018) on the PLANES dataset with a 1-cover (left), consisting of 450
samples, a 0.5-cover (center), 1682 samples, and a 0.25-cover (right), 6498 samples. Increasing the sampling den-
sity improves robustness at the same codimension, but the improvement is much less notable in high-codimension.
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